There is a big myth hanging over baseball: The team's best reliever, commonly called "the closer," should only be used to close out the game when a team is ahead.

He is paid to come in at only one time — when his team is ahead by three runs or less and commonly in the eighth or ninth inning. Like we said earlier: This is a myth and, although the concept and theory is intensely popular with baseball fans, it's not what's best for a team.

Instead, wouldn't it seem prudent to use your best reliever when the game most hangs in the balance? (Note that a "closer" is not a position. Relief pitcher most definitely is.) Yet it appears managers are very hesitant to do this and the rationale escapes even the most brilliant of baseball minds.

Take, for example, last year's Fall Classic. In the 2010 World Series, Rangers manager Ron Washington drew large amounts of criticism for not using his best reliever, Texas' "official" closer Neftali Feliz, at the times when he was needed most. The best example comes from Game 2, a game in which the Rangers eventually lost 9-0.

In the eighth inning, Texas was down 2-0, but instead of bringing out relief in the form of Feliz, relievers Darren O'Day, Derek Holland, Mark Lowe and Michael Kirkman combined to give up seven runs putting the game — and the series — out of reach for the Rangers. It took all the wind out of the Rangers' sails.

Managers are paid to maximize win percentage. At what point did Ron Washington think putting Mark Lowe in was a better decision than handing the ball over to Feliz? Feliz hadn't pitched in days (it would have been great to get him in and keep him in "game" shape) and it's not like there was any season left after this. It's not like he needed to save his arm.

If you want another example of the misuse of a closer, look no further than the first Astros game this season against the Philadelphia Phillies. Closer Brandon Lyon entered the game with a 4-2 lead in the ninth inning, the prototypical instance of using your closer. He allowed six singles, recorded only one out, blew the save and took the loss, starting Houston off with a disheartening 5-4 loss — in many ways, setting up a 8-13 struggle of a beginning.

In all of 2010, not one reliever in all of baseball entered a game in a save situation in the ninth inning and gave up six hits to earn the loss.

On the outside looking in, this just looks like a rotten outing that can be explained away. Astros manager Brad Mills did what any skipper would do in that situation: Bring in the closer. But let's take a closer look at his mistake:

1. Due up second that inning was former MVP Ryan Howard, a left-handed power hitter. According to Baseball-Reference.com, Howard's OPS (on-base plus slugging percentage) versus a right-handed pitcher such as Lyon is 1.042, a staggering number.
2. This same exact stat against left-handed pitching is a much more normal .767.
3. Couple this with the fact that Howard is 5-for-6 versus Lyon all-time (with an absolute ridiculous OPS of 2.433), you wonder why Lyon was in there to face him with the game on the line at all.
4. If that had been in the eighth inning, Mills would have brought in his left-handed specialist to face both Howard and Raul Ibanez, another left handed hitter, to maximize his chance at getting through that part of the order unscathed.

Why did Mills do this? He's playing into the myth.

The save as a stat was invented by writer Jerome Holtzman in 1960 and was officially recognized by Major League Baseball in 1969. This means it's another metric in determining a player's worth. (It seems like every closer should be sending a commission of their inflated salaries to Holtzman for making them all this extra cash.) A hierarchy exists in most bullpens that goes something like this:

1. The best is the closer;
2. then the set-up man;
3. the seventh inning guy;
4. ...and on down through middle reliever/garbage time reliever.

Normally, this system works fine, but bullpens should be flexible and egos need to be in check when it comes to winning games. However, GMs and owners pay a lot of money for late-inning closers and they demand (or expect) that they're used in save situations and shouldn't be used at other times. (They spent all this money on the guy, and, dammit, he's going to do his job.) But realize that he may not even have the hardest job in relief pitching!

Let's take a common situation that arises: An eighth inning reliever enters the game with only a one-run lead and faces the heart of the lineup, the 3, 4, 5 hitters of the opposing team. He allows one base hit, but gets the rest of the outs. His team then goes on to score another run in the next half of the inning. The closer then comes in for the ninth inning with a two-run lead and gets to face the worst of the lineup, the 7, 8, 9 hitters. He retires all three and gets the glory and the big game check.

Who had the harder job that game?

This is not to say that there shouldn't be a closer position; this is to say it is overrated. Many "closers" are only in that position because they have experience pitching in that situation and have converted a decent amount of the time. However, when certain closers move to other teams, they no longer become the go-to-guy.

Rafael Soriano was the Tampa Bay Rays closer last year, but signed a big money deal to be the setup man for the Yankees. He is the "heir apparent" to Marino Rivera, the only closer worth the paycheck closers receive. (As of writing this article, Mariano Rivera has seven saves for the Yankees and he needed only 36 pitches to convert the first four of those. There has never been a person better at their respective job than Rivera is. Never has an athlete been more beyond reproach than Rivera.)

Now, with Soriano out, Rays' manager Joe Maddon is in a unique position. He technically has no closer and has chosen to "close" by committee. Many think this is bad news for Maddon, but given the spot his management has put him in, he can be the first manager in a long time to maximize their bullpen's potential. He has three guys who all have dynamic stuff, including RHP fireballer Kyle Farnsworth and LHP young flamethrower Jake McGee.

It'll be interesting to see just how Maddon chooses to use his bullpen throughout the season when the games are close and late. So far, disappointingly, Farnsworth has all five of the saves for the 10-11 Rays heading into Sunday's games.

Hopefully, Maddon will still buck the trend and use his late innings situationally and other managers will start to realize the value of having a flexible bullpen.

Even though it will drive fantasy baseball players nuts with managers not naming a specific closer, it's the manager's job to maximize win percentage regardless of the name on the back of the jersey. And if that means bringing in Neftali Feliz in the eighth inning of a World Series game down by two, then we all need to get behind this notion.